Claude-BugHunter skills

Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question

Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.

External SSL VPN / remote-access appliance attack matrix — Cisco ASA/AnyConnect, Fortinet FortiGate/FortiOS, Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Palo Alto GlobalProtect, Pulse Secure / Ivanti Connect Secure, SonicWall, F5 Big-IP. Covers version fingerprinting, CVE matrix (2018-2026), AAA backend identification, default credentials, configuration-disclosure paths, pre-auth RCE/SSRF/path-traversal exploits where applicable. Built from authorized-engagement Cisco ASA testing plus 2024-2026 enterprise VPN CVE landscape. Use whenever the target's perimeter exposes any SSL VPN appliance or remote-access gateway — these are the most common initial-access points in 2024-2026 actor TTPs.

Hunt API security misconfiguration — mass assignment, prototype pollution, HTTP verb tampering. Mass assignment: send {is_admin:true, role:admin, verified:true} on profile/account/reset endpoints — server blindly applies. JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) is owned by hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers only non-crypto JWT handling. Prototype pollution: __proto__ injection in JSON merge / Object.assign / lodash _.merge → polluted prototype reaches sink (RCE in Node, XSS in browser). HTTP verb: GET-bypass-CSRF, X-HTTP-Method-Override, TRACE enabled. Detection: API responses with extra fields, JWTs in headers (decode at jwt.io). CORS misconfiguration (reflect-any-origin, null origin, subdomain-regex bypass, postMessage) is owned by hunt-cors. Use when hunting API misconfigs, mass-assignment, prototype pollution (JWT crypto → hunt-jwt-crypto).

Hunt ASP.NET-specific surface — ViewState deserialization (signed-only vs encrypted), machineKey recovery, dual-parser MAC-bypass anti-pattern, request-validator bypass, trace.axd/elmah.axd disclosure, load-balanced ViewState cross-node failures, SafeControl enumeration via reflection, customErrors mode=Off stack-trace leaks, classic Webforms .aspx/.asmx/.svc surface. Built for ASP.NET Webforms + WCF + SharePoint farms.

Hunt account takeover taxonomy — 9 distinct paths to ATO, plus chains. Paths: (1) password reset flaws (host-header injection redirects token, predictable/numeric token, Referer leak, no-expiry/reuse), (2) email change without re-auth, (3) OAuth account-link CSRF, (4) MFA bypass (per hunt-mfa-bypass), (5) session fixation, (6) JWT manipulation (forge token to another identity; crypto details → hunt-jwt-crypto), (7) password change without step-up (chain with login timing/length oracle), (8) social-recovery / security-question brute-force, (9) SSO subdomain takeover at OAuth redirect_uri. Chains: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = persistent ATO; lax redirect_uri = auth-code theft; dangling-CNAME takeover at redirect_uri = ATO. Validate: demonstrate real takeover of test account B from attacker A's session; OOB/Collaborator confirm blind token-leak steps. Use when hunting ATO chains, testing password reset / email change / MFA / OAuth / session / JWT, or chaining primitives t

Hunting skill for cache poison vulnerabilities. Built from 10 public bug bounty reports including X-Forwarded-Host poisoning, X-HTTP-Method-Override / GCS cache, reflected→stored XSS via cache, classic Omer-Gil Web Cache Deception, Cloudflare Cache Deception Armor bypass, session-token cache deception, Akamai hop-by-hop smuggling → server-side edge poisoning, and Kettle's 2024 path-normalization WCD against Cloudflare/Fastly/GCP. Host/X-Forwarded-Host injection that reaches app logic (reset-link poisoning, routing SSRF, OAuth issuer) is owned by hunt-host-header; this skill owns the case where the poisoned response is CACHED and served to other users. Use when hunting cache poisoning, Web Cache Deception, CDN-fronted apps.

Hunt CAPTCHA Bypass — 6 distinct patterns: (1) CAPTCHA field simply omitted from the request (server-side validation absent), (2) CAPTCHA token replayed from a solved challenge (no single-use enforcement), (3) CAPTCHA response accepted on a different endpoint than it was solved on (no binding to action/session), (4) static or predictable CAPTCHA values accepted (e.g. '0', 'null', empty string), (5) audio/accessibility CAPTCHA trivially solvable programmatically, (6) CAPTCHA only enforced after N failures (first N requests bypass it). Detection: intercept a successful form submission, remove the CAPTCHA field entirely, replay — if it still succeeds, server-side validation is absent. Medium severity standalone; High when it removes the only rate-limit gate protecting a login, registration, or payment endpoint.

Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terraform state file leakage, artifact/log secret leakage, pipeline env-var disclosure. Use when target has a public GitHub/GitLab org, exposed CI dashboards (Jenkins/TeamCity/Drone/Argo), or build artifacts/images are reachable.

Hunt Clickjacking — missing X-Frame-Options / CSP frame-ancestors lets an attacker embed the target page in an invisible iframe and trick victims into clicking buttons they cannot see (UI redressing). Targets: login flows, money transfers, account settings, OAuth confirmation pages. Confirm by fetching the page, then PROVE it frames in a real browser and a sensitive state-changing action survives the cross-site context (SameSite cookies / framebusting JS can defeat it) — header-absence alone is not a finding.

Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessible via SSRF. GCP: public GCS buckets, exposed Cloud Run services, leaked service account JSON. Azure: public blob containers, exposed Function App. (Kubernetes/Docker exposure is owned by hunt-k8s; CI/CD pipeline attacks by hunt-cicd; post-credential IAM escalation by cloud-iam-deep.) Detection: targeted dorking, certificate transparency, JS bundle secret extraction, port scan for known service ports. Validate: actual data read / write / RCE. Use when hunting cloud-native storage and compute misconfig (S3/GCS/Blob, IMDS-via-SSRF, serverless, public managed services).

Hunting skill for csrf vulnerabilities. Built from 15 public bug bounty reports including modern variants — SameSite=Lax sibling-subdomain bypass (Argo CD CVE-2024-22424), GraphQL mutations-via-GET (GitLab $3,370), framework-wide CSRF middleware disabled (Stripe Dashboard $5,000), path-traversal CSRF-token bypass (GitHub Enterprise CVE-2022-23732 $10k), Origin-omission bypass (TikTok $2,500), OAuth-state null-byte (Streamlabs), WebSocket CSRF / CSWSH (Coda), default-SameSite email-change → ATO (YoYo Games $400), social-account-link CSRF (HackerOne), JSON-CSRF via text/plain on email-change (TikTok $500). Use when hunting modern CSRF — heavy emphasis on chain-to-ATO patterns.

Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and print the taxonomy. Not for direct user invocation.

Hunt mishandling of exceptional conditions — feed an endpoint malformed/unexpected input (wrong type, broken JSON, oversized field, null byte) and make it fail OPEN or leak internals: a verbose stack-trace / framework error page that discloses ORM internals, server file paths, library versions, or a language traceback. Use on any input-accepting endpoint (JSON APIs, forms, query params). Medium-High when the leak exposes internal structure that arms a deeper attack.

Hunt Forgot Password / Account Recovery Authentication Flaws — 5 distinct patterns: (1) username enumeration via different responses for valid vs invalid email, (2) reset token exposed directly in the API response body, (3) reset token not invalidated after use (replay), (4) password reset link works from a different IP/browser (no binding), (5) no rate limit on the reset request endpoint. These are the standalone recovery-flow broken-auth primitives — distinct from reset-email host-header poisoning (hunt-host-header) and the full ATO chain (hunt-ato owns password-reset as an ATO path; prove the primitive here, chain it there). Detection: trace the full forgot-password flow from request to token to use; check response diffs between valid/invalid emails; test token replay after consumption. Medium to High (enumeration=Medium, token-reuse=High, account-takeover=Critical when chained to known-email).

Hunt Host Header Injection — password reset poisoning → ATO, web cache poisoning via unkeyed Host/X-Forwarded-Host, routing-based SSRF (Host picks upstream → cloud metadata/internal services), path-override SSRF/ACL-bypass (X-Original-URL/X-Rewrite-URL), OAuth redirect_uri/issuer poisoning, and absolute-URL link poisoning in emails. High to Critical when it reaches ATO or mass cache poisoning. Built on public Host-header research (PortSwigger 'Practical web cache poisoning' + James Kettle, and the classic password-reset-poisoning class). Use on any forgot-password flow, CDN/reverse-proxy-fronted app, OAuth/OIDC endpoint, or absolute-URL-in-email feature.

Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript). Lower severity than XSS but enables phishing, UI manipulation, and credential harvesting via injected forms. Use when testing text-display surfaces (search results, profile fields, comments, error messages, feedback forms). For markup that executes JavaScript, escalate to hunt-xss.

Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by sending TE: chunked but with body that fits CL count. TE.CL: opposite. H2.CL: HTTP/2 downgrade, smuggle CL into HTTP/1.1 back-end. Detection tools: Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension, smuggler.py, h2csmuggler. Confirm: time-delay technique (smuggled GET with 30s timeout) — if front-end returns slow on next victim request, smuggling works. Validate: cache poisoning chain (smuggle request that gets cached for victim), credential theft (smuggle X-Forwarded-For override that captures next user's cookies), bypass auth (smuggled internal-path request). Real paid examples from major CDN deployments. Use when hunting H1 paid programs running CDN+origin stacks, when targeting load balancer / WAF bypass.

Hunt Local File Inclusion (LFI), Remote File Inclusion (RFI), and Path Traversal — /etc/passwd read, log poisoning → RCE, PHP filter-chain RCE (no upload needed), php:// / data:// / zip:// / phar:// wrappers, RFI via allow_url_include, directory traversal read/write/delete. Covers OOB/blind LFI confirmation and false-positive discipline. Use when hunting file-include or path-traversal bugs on any target.

Hunt MFA / 2FA bypass — 7 distinct patterns. (1) MFA not enforced on sensitive endpoints (password change, email change accept without MFA challenge), (2) MFA-step skip via direct navigation to post-login URL, (3) MFA-token replay (same code accepted twice), (4) brute-force the 6-digit OTP without rate limit (10^6 attempts at server speed), (5) race condition on OTP validation, (6) recovery-code dump via /api/me, (7) backup factor downgrade (SMS factor with no rate limit). Plus the chain: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = ATO without MFA challenge. Detection: trace auth flow in Burp, find every state transition, check if MFA is middleware-gated vs per-endpoint, check OTP entropy and rate limit on OTP-validate. Validate: attacker session reaching post-MFA state. Use when hunting auth bypass, MFA flows, chaining primitives toward ATO.

Hunting skill for misc vulnerabilities. Built from 225 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting misc on any target.

Hunt NoSQL Injection — MongoDB operator injection ($where, $regex, $gt, $ne), CouchDB, Redis command injection, auth bypass via NoSQLi, data dump. Use when target uses MongoDB/Mongoose, CouchDB, Redis, or shows NoSQL error messages.

Hunt Open Redirect — all types including low-impact, chained to OAuth token theft → ATO, phishing chains. URL parameter manipulation, JavaScript redirect, meta refresh, header injection. Use when hunting redirect bugs or building ATO chains.

Hunting skill for rce vulnerabilities. Built from 67 public bug bounty reports. Use when hunting rce on any target.